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I have come  this far  in my professional career by not making fore-
casts.  I am therefore a bit intimidated by the  invitation to  look forward
to  the year 2005.  It  involves  less  risk on my part because  I will
probably not be around to be  reminded of how wrong I was.  The other side
of  the coin  is  that it  is  too close for comfort.To give you some idea of
relative time distances,  I am asked  to  look forward in time  for a period
no greater than the  time  that has passed  since the assassination of  John
F. Kennedy.  And that was only yesterday.  The challenge  of  trying to
forecast what will happen in the next  21 years falls  in what  I will call
the  twilight  zone of economic history.  It  is  too long a period for 1984
· to  be remembered vividly by the  people who will live that  long, and 1984
will not be far enough away in 2005  to  excite the professional historians.
Consequently, what I have to say is  said with a good bit of  reservation
and with a standard error of estimation that will fall outside acceptable
levels for most economic forecasting.
As  I have prepared these notes I have been guided by one dominant
fact that will set the  stage for  the remarks that  follow.  That  is  the
unprecedented expansion in productivity  in agriculture in  the developed,
industrialized nations.  If anything should surprise us  it  is  the fact
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that old,  tired, war-torn western Europe  is now self-sufficient  in food-
grains and  is  exporting as our competitor.  Germany lost approximately
one-fourth of its area after  the First World War, in  the partition that
created the corridor all-ott'dto Poland, and reduced the  East Prussia area.
That  came out  of  grain surplus producing lands.  Germany lost  another
one-fourth of her territory at the  end of  the  Second World War.  That rump
of  Germany was further reduced by the separation between East Germany and
West Germany, in the  creation of  the  Soviet  Zone  of occupation after 1945.
The rump that remained after 1945,  involving the French, British and
American zones  of West Germany, represented the rump of a rump of  a rump.
That  intensively industrialized area today is almost  100 percent  self-
sufficient  in foodgrains.
The UK wheat yield in 1984 for  the entire  country is estimated at an
average of 98 bushels an acre.  A sizeable number of farms  in the East
Midlands, from Cambridge east and north, were reporting  1984 wheat yields
of  140 bushels an acre and above  (The Economist, Sept.  8, 1984, p. 61).
France has emerged as the second largest grain exporter in the world--
edging out Canada in 1984.
Looking across  the Atlantic, the US doubled  its production of
wheat and  coarse grains  between 1961-63 and  1981-83, and this doubling
occurred from an existing high level of output.  In  the same period
the U.S.  tripled  its grain exports, also from a relatively high level.
These bits of evidence support  the remarkable agricultural fact of
recent decades, which has been the expanded productive capacity of  the
industrialized, developed countries.  This must mean only one thing,
and  that  is  that  industrially based  inputs have become more important
than agriculturally based inputs  in accounting for further agricultural-3-
production advances.  Among the economics fraternity there will be general
agreement on this  conclusion.  It has played havoc with export markets.
It  is not  the only disruptive factor but  I believe  it will have to be listed
as  the  dominant one.  Closely related  has been the unxpectedly strong position
of  the American dollar.  This has been associated with a distressingly large
American commodity trade deficit.  We have long been accustomed to  a healthy
commodity trade surplus, and especially in agriculture.  As a consequence
of  the  strong dollar and  the related trade deficit we now face an  importing
world of customers in which  the real price  of American grains has risen 75
percent since 1980  for the German buyer, in terms  of the Marks he must
surrender in 1984.  It has risen 100 percent,  that  is,  it  is  twice as
expensive, for those buying with Sterling in the  UK and in other areas of
the Sterling block.  The price of US grains has risen well over 100 percent
since 1980 for  those buying with French Francs, or  for  the members of
the Franc block, which includes  some important areas in Africa.  Consequently,
a sizeable fraction of  the total customer world that we would like  to  think
of as ours has seen  the price of  U.S. grains increase anywhere  from 60  to
100 percent since 1980, without any appreciable change in price having
occurred in the United States.  We are  only just becoming aware  of  the
fact that  our grains are being priced out  of  the world market.
This deficiency in understanding is  associated with an institutional
defect that  can only be characterized as a failure of  the legislative
process.  The Congress has been unable to  resolve key conflicts  in
economic policy.  Some crucial aspects of policymaking have been  left by
default to  the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board.  These have
become in our  time effective  legislative instruments.  One principal
consequence has been  that for  two decades the fight against  inflation-4-
has been lost  by default  in the  Congress and  in the Administration, leaving
the Federal Reserve Board as the only viable agency left  to  fight it.  It
has to  fight with the  tools  that it  recognizes  and has at  its command.
That  is a limited range of tools.
In no reasonable sense can the  Federal Reserve Board be said to be a
tax  levying  authority.  The  Congress  is.  Inflation could have been fought by
the  tax route.  It was  not.  This left  it up  to  the Federal Reserve Board
to use the only  tool it  had, which was the interest  rate.  A fight  against
inflation using  the  interest rate as a tool has one  implicit consequence:
The differential burden of  the fight must be borne by those borrowers  for
whom the payout period has the  longest  time horizon.  As a result,  the
burden is  disproportionately shifted onto the agricultural  sector, the
heavy machinery manufacturing sector, the house building sector, and to
any other sector that must borrow long term.  Any commitment of  capital
over a period of time  in  excess of  3 to 5 year means that  repayment
capacity extends beyond the range of effective economic forecasting.
This abdication of responsibility by the Congress  in shifting the burden
of  the anti-inflation fight  onto the Federal Reserve Board  is at the
root of much of our difficulty today.
If we take a closer look at our current export market prospects,
we must begin with one remarkable  fact.  As  recently as  two or three
years ago  the European Common Market was producing more of certain  types
of  grain than they could consume domestically, especially soft  wheats
and  some feedgrain. and were exporting them onto the world market with
the aid of a very substantial export  subsidy.  For example,  to get
barley into the world market  in  1982  the  Common Market was paying an
export subsidy of  over  80 dollars per ton.  For wheat,  the export-5-
subsidy was as  high as 90 dollars a ton in some months.  The price of  U.S.
corn (a competing feed grain) at Rotterdam at  that  time was about $125 a
ton.  An export subsidy of $80 to  $90 a ton  to permit competition with a
product that  could be  laid down  in Rotterdam for under  $140 was a very
expensive export subsidy.  It was virtually eliminated in 1984 by the
appreciation of  the  dollar which had  repriced U.S. grains  in the European
market  to a degree  that enabled  the  EEC  to export in some months  in 1984
with no export  subsidy at all.  This  is almost unheard of  in the history
of  the Common Market, and is  dramatic evidence of what a strong dollar
has  done in pricing us  out of world markets.
The declines in U.S. grain exports due to  the appreciation of  the dollar
have not been evenly distributed over  the market spectrum.  In percentage
terms  they have probably been most extreme  in Eastern Europe.  U.S.  agri-
cultural exports  to Eastern Europe in 1983 were valued at $634 million net;
they had been worth  1.5 billion dollars  two years earlier  (USDA,  FATUS,
May-June  1984).  Some  idea of  the  significance of this market loss in
relative terms  is provided by the fact  that  the value of U.S.  agricultural
exports  to Portugal in  the first  three quarters of  fiscal 1984 exceeded
the value of all agricultural exports  to  the six countries  of  Eastern
Europe (USDA, FATUS, July-August 1984).
There are  some brighter spots.  One of  them is East Asia, where
U.S. agricultural exports  to Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have held
up relatively well.  In  1984 U.S. exports  of  farm products to  these four
countries of  Eastern Asia will exceed our exports to  all 17  countries of
Western Europe which was long considered our traditional grain export
market.  The East Asian market now supplants the whole of western Europe
as a market for  American agricultural exports.  The long run significance-6-
of  this crossover hardly need emphasis in a midwest farm audience.  The
prospects  for continued growth in that market are particularly good, for
several interesting reasons.  One is  that much of the US  grain is used
for  livestock feed instead of using  it for food.  A second characteristic
is  that most of  it  is  fed to pigs and chickens  instead of beef animals.
Since grain is  a much larger component  of  total feed consumption for
pigs and chickens than for ruminant  (beef, milk) animals,  this East
Asian demand is  for grains  in which the U.S. has a clear cut comparative
advantage,  leading  to a stable,predictable market.
A third moderating influence is  that the dollar appreciation against
the yen,  the principal currency of  the area, has been less  than against
the currencies  of other major trading nations.  In fact,  the dollar has
not particularly appreciated against the yen since 1980.  Most of  the
horror stories about the effect of the strong dollar on U.S. export trade
are with reference to key western European currencies.  The Japanese
have been lucky or smart enough  to have kept the dollar/yen exchange
ratios in rather good balance.  There is currently no sharp advantage  to
one side or the  other in U.S.-Japanese trading relations as a consequence
of  an over- or under-valued currency.  The U.S. has often  argued that
the Japanese yen is not properly valued, but  that reflects  our particular
point of view with respect to  export potential.
One measure of  the significance of  this  East Asian market is  that  in
1984  it  is expected to account for just under 30 percent of  total American
agricultural exports.  Japan alone  is forecast  to account for just under
20 percent of  total U.S. agricultural exports.  It  is not surprising that
many of  our grain marketing agencies and cooperatives in the Midwest are
beginning  to  look west instead  of  south or east for export markets.  The-7-
dividing  line demarcating  the East-West grainshed once went  through
central Montana.  In the 1970's it moved east in Montana, and  then'into
western North Dakota.  We now have farmer-owned cooperatives in western
Minnesota building sidings  to handle 55-car unit  train shipments  to
Portland.  Somewhere west of Missouri perhaps  in western Kansas and
in central Nebraska, there must be a dividing  line west of which an
increasing  amount of grain is  probably going  to move to the Pacific in
the future.  When I look to the year 2005  one thing I think I see  is  a
movement of this  grain shed further east and south.
I turn now to a look at export market potentials in some of our
most promising markets  in  the so-called LDCs,  or  less  developed countries.
Many people have looked at  the forecasts of population increase in that
part of  the world and have concluded  that population growth alone would
guarantee an ever-expanding market.  The well-publicized and uncontrolled
population growth in the developing:  world was at  the  root of much of
the inflation in American agricultural land prices  in the  1970s.  Several
things have happened to cause us  to reform our interpretation of  those
data in  the  last  few years.  For one thing, many of these newly independent
countries are now experiencing very severe internal political and economic
difficulties and have suddenly rediscovered the  advantages of agricultural
self-sufficiency.  For some time  in the  1970s  this  perception was postponed
by the careless extension of credit by some of  the largest credit agencies
in the  developed countries.  The  list  includes many of  the blue  chip North
American banks, Citycorp,  Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers
Hanover, Morgan Guaranty, Chemical Bank, Continental Illinois,  and many
others.  It  turns  out that,  in effect,  the private sector was financing a
form of food aid without any control by Congress.  Grain was delivered
on the basis  of  credit much of which would not be  repaid.  It would have-8-
been more direct  and received a better screening  if  it had gone  through
the PL 480 process.  That segment of  the export market potential has
dried up.  Many of  the  recipient countries and certainly many of  the
European and the  North American bankers  that have been financing that
trade will  think twice before they repeat it.  There is  little prospect
for renewal of  grain trade on the scale  that prevailed in the  late  1970s
on the basis of  credit support  that did not reflect good  financial judge-
ment.
There is  another reason why the U.S. grain export potential to the
developing  countries may be less  than we think it  should be  or could be.
That  is  the growing realization that many of  the grain imports have been
used  to support inefficient  or corrupt governments.  Some of  the govern-
ments in question have fallen by their own weight of  inefficiency.  In
other cases the degree of  their inefficiency has become so apparent  that
it  is now increasingly clear  that international social policy  is  involved
in a decision to continue grain exports  that support governments in their
persistent refusal  to  face up  to  the possibilities  of reforming  their
internal agricultural policy.  The  leading example, of  course,  is  the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet  Union in 1984/85 will account for  24 percent of  total
wheat and  coarse grains moving  in international trade, or 50 million out
of a total of  205.7 million tons  (USDA, FAS, FG-14-84, Nov.  1984).  When
one-fourth of  total world  trade in grains depends on one  set of decision-
makers sitting in one country you have a fragile market.  It has been
erratic in the past  and I see no reason to  expect that  this will not
continue.  I also see no reason  to  expect that  the world will ignore  the
fact that the import  of  50 million tons  of  grain by the  Soviet Union is-9-
a gigantic admission of  the  inadequacy of  their agricultural system.  The
opinion of world leaders will not  influence  the-Soviets in  their interpre-
tation of  that  result, but within the  time frame of the  forecast horizon
that  I was given for this assignment it  seems probable that people  in the
Soviet Union will see  the folly of  this dependence.  The short crop  in
1984  is estimated at 170 million tons.  Waste and dockage is  estimated
at 19 million tons,  and seed usage  at  27 million tons.  Deducting waste
and seed requirements from their 1984 crop leaves  124 million tons  for
domestic use.  Total livestock feed use  is estimated at  123 million tons
(USDA,  FAS, SG-13-84, Nov. 13,  1984).  This means  that  the 50 million tons
of  grain imports  is an amount  equivalent  in tonnage  to  total domestic
food use.
At some point officials will arise in  the Soviet Union who are aware
of the inconsistencies  of this  position and who will see  the savings  that
could be  accomplished by improved utilization, not  to mention the  potential
for increased productivity.  The possibilities are  really formidable.
Begin by assuming no  increase in the relative  levels of yields that  they
have experienced over  the past decade.  Assume that  they will achieve
half of  the gains in livestock feeding efficiency already achieved by
Hungary in modernizing their  livestock feeding enterprises.  Assume  that
waste will be  reduced to just half of  their present  level, which varies
from 10  to  15 percent.  Assume  that,  instead of  seeding over  3 bushels
per acre, seed useis cut to  a bushel and a half  an acre for wheat and
barley, which is  still well above the  level achieved in Canada at similar
latitudes.  Make  those assumptions and  the grain saved would be equal  to
annual average  Soviet grain imports of  the  last  three years.  In  other
words, by utilization improvements  alone with no increase  in output  they-10-
have a reasonable potential for eliminating grain imports  at current levels
of use.  I regard that  as a fragile market and a very weak base on which
to build expectations regarding market expansion potentials for American
grains.
This throws  in sharp  focus a larger issue  concerning the general
efficiency of socialist agriculture.  J. G. Patel, then Governor of  the
Central Bank of  India, has pointed out  that socialist agriculture is a
device for disguising unemployment in socially acceptable ways  (The Economist,
India Survey, March 28,  1981, p. 47).  It  does so at  the expense  of  a greatly
impaired incentive  structure and retarded  personal income growth in  the
rural sector.  But it  is  effective in disguising unemployment  in socially
acceptable ways.  Western or capitalist agriculture can be characterized
in the same sense as  a device for disguising exploitative employment  in
socially acceptable ways.  The exploitation  of  labor in agriculture is
disguised through the device of a family-operated unit that  it makes it
possible to exploit  labor to  a degree  that would be  intolerable if  labor
was organized under an industrial wage  structure.  At the expense of
considerable personal sacrifice we have devised a very effective teaching
instrument involving a structure of numerous relatively small farms  that
can fail, and that permit  the exploitation of  labor  in socially acceptable
ways.
This is  a magnificiant learning situation.  There  is no future more
dim or more uninviting than a future involving business firms that  cannot
be permitted to fail.  We are just about to  cross  the  threshhold into a
world in which we have business firms  that are so big or so vulnerable
that we cannot permit  them to  fail.  We could not permit Lockheed to  fail,
we  could not permit Chrysler to  fail, we could not permit Continential
Illinois  to fail.  This  is  accepted in the industrial and financial world-11-
of  today.  What  is not generally accepted is  that we now have some agri-
business  firms so big  that'they cannot be permitted to  fail.  We are
about  to lose  the learning tool that was represented by a population of
many small farms,  collectively making important decisions but individually
independent,  and none so large  that  they would not be permitted to  fail.  More
importantly, that failure could be accomplished at relatively low social
cost.  That  is  the strength of  the capitalist system in agriculture.  As
soon as  failure is prevented from occuring you are  impairing the very root
of  that  strength.
It  is  distressing to hear many proposals for agricultural relief  that
would sell out the  one great advantage  that we have  in family-farm type
agriculture for what amounts figuratively  to a mess of  pottage.  The
stability achieved would be artificial and could be only sustained by
continued capital movements from  the nonfarm sector into the farm sector.
But do  the people who advocate a viable small farm sector really understand
the economic issues?  I am not encouraged by some  of the meetings  that
I attend or some of  the articles  that I read.  Many of  the people who
nominally support a structure of family-type farming do not really know
why they support it  or what good economic reasons would be for  supporting
it.  The argument is reduced  to emotional terms and has no solid root  in
economic analysis.  Because it  has had no solid root  in economic analysis
it has been easy to demolish the argument offered by many people who would
continue the  support for that  type of agriculture.  The people who have
demolished the argument have themselves  failed to think their way through
the various issues involved and  do not understand what would be destroyed
if  they destroy that  system.  So we have  the real elements of a Greek
tragedy, in that neither side understands the  roots of  the argument.-12-
In  the business world  today, many businessmen have persuaded them-
selves that  it  is  cheaper to buy technology than to  grow it.  Many of
our institutions of higher education--schools  of business administration,
law schools,  institutes  of engineering and agricultural colleges--have
been turning out practioneers whose concept of  the way  to get  rich quick
is  to buy a set  of  fast-growing or frontier  technology, without much thought
to  the process by which  that frontier  technology was created.  And this  is
reinforced by much that is being taught  in our universities.  Much of
the time in business schools and in law schools is  spent in  teaching how
to accomplish takeover bids, how to ward off  takeover bids,  and how to
master leveraged financing.  Teaching, in other words, how to  practice
economic brigandage.  In too many cases, students are not being taught
how to  create wealth.  They look upon wealth in the same way that  the
conquistadors looked upon  it when they went into Central and South America
and captured the gold and silver of  the Incas and  the Aztecs.  Too much
time  is  spent  teaching people how to  fight effectively over division of
the  spoils.  Too  little  time  is devoted  to how you create wealth in
the  first place.  For that reason I see some hazard ahead in agriculture
because we too are  training people in agriculture to do all of  the things
I  mentioned:  High leveraged financing, acquisition bids, buy  technologies
instead of  grow them, abandon the  system that has produced a high level
of  agricultural technology almost without having given  it  any thought.
It  is  in this  sense that I see a big challenge  for our credit  institutions.
I refer specifically to the Farm Credit  Service, which now has  60 percent
of the total outstanding farm real estate debt held by institutions in the
United States.  When you hold 60% of  the total of  farm real estate  credit
in the United States you can no longer behave as an ordinary business firm.-13-
You have to behave like a socially responsible arm of  government, which
in fact you will become if  there is  a severe  crisis.  Fifty years ago
when we had a crisis in the 1930s  there was no question about who stood
behind the  farm credit system.  There was no question about whose land it
was when Land Banks foreclosed in the  1930s.  There  is a question  today
about whose land  it  is,  and what backup support will be  available in a
real crisis,  not just a few bankruptcies.  Consequently we have some big
challenges  ahead of us  in trying to use credit institutions  as change
instruments  to promote desirable directions  of  change.  What is  distressing
is that some of  the motivational goals that are adopted by these insti-
tutions--private sector and cooperative sector alike--concern increasing
their market share with almost no thought  to what consequence will result
from that effort.
My nomination today for the greatest  opportunity available to any
credit institution in the United States  is  the opportunity available to
the Farm Credit Service to pioneer innovative methods  of  equity financing.
And  if they do not pioneer in this way it will be done  in the private
sector, and at much higher social cost.  The model provided by Ag Land
Fund I, promoted by Merrill Lynch and  the  Continental Illinois  Bank in
1977  is very much before us today.  The great challenge  to  the Farm
Credit Service is  to  come up with its  own version of  an imaginative
way of arranging a buy and  lease back provision that does genuinely
preserve  the possibility that the option to buy by  the farmer who  lost
his farm will be recognized.  The big danger, of course, is  that much
of the equity financing that  is being proposed in the private  sector
today is  not true equity financing.  It  is  promoted by firms  that want-14-
a chance  to have a cut in  the  price action that  they anticipate will
occur when farm land prices  turn around and start up again.  They are
not interested particularly in a well financed agricultural system.  They
want  a piece of  the  capital gain.  That motive I submit is  the wrong
motive for promoting a system of agricultural equity financing.  The Farm
Credit Service would not be  suspect  of doing  it for  that motive and has
a much better playing field  in which to  innovate.  I see this as a tre-
mendous opportunity.
Another potential that concerns me as  I look down  the obscure  21
years to  2005  is  the possibility that we in agricultural will experience
a phenomenon that is  now convulsing  the  nonfarm sector.  That has  to do
with the growth of what is  called off-shore sourcing.  This  is a bit
of  jargon  that  describes  the process by which domestic firms contract
abroad for parts or complete assemblies and slip out  from under the
control of domestic institutions and especially labor unions.  This is
going on in many many fields.  It  is  already very well developed in
automotive and mechanical  technology, in pharmaceuticals  and drugs,  and
in  other chemical fields,  including fertilizers.  I am suggesting to
you that we stand before  the  door which is already  open to  a world in
which off-shore sourcing will develop in  the field of agriculture.
Agricultural research has now become  so expensive in  the U.S.  that  it
is  probably going  to move offshore.  We  cannot afford much of  the
agricultural research we need at  the prices which must be paid to get
it  done in the United States  today.  It seems almost certain to happen
in biotechnology.  When a few of  the  fertilizer plants come on stream
that are now being built in Saudia Arabia and elsewhere we are going
to  see a revolution in the fertilizer business.-15-
I assume  that  the concern that now disturbs the auto workers or the
steel workers will rapidly become the  concern of  the American agricultural
establishment.  I refer to  the Deans and.Directors  of  the Agricultural
Universities and Experiment Stations, who will see their control over
research resources slipping out from under them.  It will certainly be
cheaper to do this  research abroad then  it will be  to  do it  at home.  A
number of  foreign countries will have a well-trained corps  of  people to
do it,  many of  them trained in  the United States.  They will have greater
freedom in which to operate  then will be possible in the United States.
That freedom will come from less  attention to  environmental protection
measures, from less attention to public health protection measures, from
fewer reporting constraints, and from less  attention to equal-opportunity
hiring rules.  For whatever reason, it will become more efficient to
conduct agricultural research abroad then it  is  in the United States.
I see this as a possible outgrowth of the trends  that will carry us into
the  21st century.  This may seem to you to  be rather pessimistic.  I do
not  regard it that way.  I do feel, however, that effective optimism should
be steely-eyed, cold-hearted and bloody-minded.  And so I have been trying
to give you some effective optimism.
I would like to  conclude with some arbitrary observations.  First,
given the technology usable in  the Soviet Union, it  is very clear  that
the possibility of economic convergence among  the great nations  of  the
world is  greatest between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The
U.S.S.R. can buy  almost literally all of the agricultural technology
they need off  the shelf  in the U.S.  The scale will be appropriate, the
design will  be appropriate, and the purpose to be  served will be  appropriate.
It there are any two agricultural economies in the world that  ought  to-16-
try to work together,  they are  the  Soviet Union and  the United States.
If any convergence in economic systems  is possible within  our present
politicized world it  should be  greatest in the agricultural sectors of
these  two countries.  The  technology is almost  totally interchangeable.
Second, I am aware that  our progress in  the development of  that
technology  is  a result of  the fact that we have distorted our investment
in agricultural research by a concentration on technology  that could be
applied  through  the use of  petrochemical tools.  We  have a petrochemical
based agricultural  technology.  This  is especially pertinent  for the
grains,  including rice, for soybeans,  and for cotton.  If  you pick up a
typical farm paper,  leaf through it, and mentally blank out every page
or part  of  a page  that advertises a petrochemical technology you would
virtually wipe out the present farm press.  It  knows on which side its
bread  is  oiled.  In  this sense,  the private  sector extension system
delivers information through agricultural journals far more effectively
than is  done in the'public sector, but  it  is a biased delivery system.
It gets  its reward by delivering a certain  type of  technology that  can
attract a certain class  of  advertisers.  By the same  token  it neglects
other dimensions of  technology.  This biased delivery system in the
private sector extension service has dictated  the kind of  technology
that  has received the most investment and command over resources in
American agriculture.  That  is not necessarily the best mix of  technology
for the rest of  the world, or even for  the United States.
Third, we have adopted a numberof policies in the United States
that have had the  indirect but sometimes unintended consequence of  very
heavily subsidizing a certain kind  of agriculture.  Specifically,  the-17-
deduction of  interest  on debt in the  reporting of  income  tax liability on
Form 1040  is a major  subsidy to  large  farms.  As  long as you can  set up
a form of business enterprise in a way that  enables this  deduction potential
to be preserved for  the individual investor you can create a biased flow
of funds in agriculture.  It  is biased by the  fact that  capital can receive
a higher rate  of real return by entering in a form that will permit use
of  all  the deductions  possible  in subtracting  interest charges when computing
tax liability.  This  is a very expensive form of subsidy, and it  is  only
available to high income  investors.  In addition, we have permitted the
rapid depreciation of  capital.  That was multiplied by  some power  function
in the  1981 tax bill.  It  is  strange that an administration  that claims
that it is seeking  to restore a market  system and achieve a reduction of
government interference in business has  chosen as  its principal instrument
the manipulation of the  tax rate  structure.  The result  is a tax structure
that gives an advantage  to certain  sources of  capital investment.
In this  regard I foresee another possibility which is  beyond the
scope of my assignment  today, but I think is worth mentioning.  These
depreciation allowances have become  so  outrangeously out  of  line with
reality  that we are virtually certain to have a commercial real estate
price collapse within the next  five years.  We have a lot  of  commercial
construction that  is not justified by market analysis or by the possi-
bility of  theeconomic use of  space.  It  is primarily justified by the
financial subsidy that  can be  gained through building under present
depreciation allowances.  To achieve maximum benefits, the properties
must be sold within about half  the  life of  the depreciated property.
This means  that somewhere between 5 and  7 years after  construction
somebody has  to  take  it  off your hands  or the advantage that you were-18-
going  to  get by this  subsidy will be  lost.  Since much of  this  tax-induced
construction occurred in  the past three  years, it will have  to come on the
market  in a similar  three year period.  There  is a high probability that we
will have a commercial sector repetition of  the  agricultural -sector  land
price  collapse that we are now living through.  It will have been created
by the  artificial stimulation growing out  of accelerated depreciation
ad pted  in  the 1981 Reagan  tax bill, and  it will probably not be attributed
to  its source.
Fourth, and finally, we are still subsidizing the use of  cheap water
and cheap energy and  these too  have been subsidies  to  large scale agri-
culture.  In the Southern Great Plains we have  the largest concentration
of  beef cattle  feedlots  in  the United States, existing on a heavily
subsidized economic base.  This takes  the form of  cheap fuel in the form
of  underpriced natural gas;  irrigation, using  cheap water involving no extraction
or severance tax for its withdrawal;  and a very high writeoff  of  the
capital equipment invested in feedlots and  irrigation.  It  is  frequently
said that  there  is no subsidy to  beef cattle.  A good topic  for a future
seminar would be  to enumerate  the ways  in which a certain structural form
of  the livestock industry  is being very heavily subsidized.  None of
those subsidies are worth much to a family-type cattle feeder who does
not havea net taxable income  above about $20,000 a year.  As a result,
the way in which we subsidize  these firms has not only directed production
to certain geographic areas but  it has dictated the mix of size of farms
involved in  the feeding operation.  Until we correct  that we cannot really
talk about a market economy in agriculture.
I would like  to  end on a bright note.  The one I nominate for the
brightest prospect  I can think of  between now and the year  2005  is  the-19-
possibility that we can develop offshore sourcing to include  the sale
abroad of services to  agriculture, in much the same way  that  the non-farm
sector is replacing commodity exports with the sale  of  services.  The
management of agricultural research is  still a sector in which the United
States has a comparative advantage.